Evolving situation: Attempted coup in Sudan

Khartoum kunawaka moto, Conflict between the Sudan army and a special force called RSF - Rapid support forces. What do we know?

I though ni ile ingine


Tupee videoss.

Arap Mantis achukue notes

hakuna videos internet imezimwa

Ariff wangu aliweka whatsapp status video ya gunfire kitu 7am leo…na ameingia offline, hope ako sawa


Bonobo Akina @TrumanCapote wameamua kuchoma planes


I blame Raila for giving RSF the idea

Bonobo manenos


coup aje na hakuna president? watang’oa nani kwa power?

C’mon. There is always someone or a small group in power. Things don’t run themselves.

Kuna jangili anaitwa dagalo…ndiye vice president na leader wa hiyo paramilitary…yeye ndiyo kusema huko sudan.anaogopwa kama baba…Ako wanted Hague…inakaa ameshiba general burhan…so burhan amesema kaa mbaya mbaya…katambe…

The SAF and RSF are different and draw from different areas. The SAF is still a hotbed of Islamist activism within the ranks of an organization that was never fully purged of loyalists from the Bashir/NCP years. The RSF is openly anti-Islamist, and Hemedti, seeking internal allies against the SAF, has positioned himself as regretting the October 25, 2021 military coup carried out by his partner Al-Burhan. But both rival strongmen share one thing: Both openly thirst for power, with a thirst that is barely concealed in the rhetoric each utilizes to maneuver internally and internationally.

And while the struggle in Sudan is mostly internal, there are a couple of key international elements that further muddy the waters. The SAF and Al-Burhan are the best thing that Egypt has seen in Sudan for decades. Sudan’s former colonial masters in Cairo (Egyptian ties to Sudan, and intervention in Sudan, go back centuries) see in the Sudanese Army’s current leadership their best hope for influence along the Nile Valley, at a time when Egypt faces an uncertain situation both internally and with Ethiopia. Sudan was a major conduit for assistance to Tigrayan rebels in Ethiopia during the recent war.

So while there are still Islamists inside the SAF, Egypt is prioritizing the emergence of authoritarian military rule in Sudan that would mirror its own as much as possible – devout but anti-Islamist (anti-Muslim Brotherhood but relatively sympathetic to other types of conservative Islam) with a military economic empire above and immune from the civilian state. Such a regime in Khartoum would be in lockstep with Cairo on the issue of the waters of the Nile and hostile to Ethiopia.

If Egypt prioritizes the dominance of the Sudanese Army and the Nile Question, the RSF is supported by, among others, the United Arab Emirates (UAE). And here, the shadow of Ethiopia looms large as well. The UAE, and by extension Hemedti, are seen by Egypt as supporters of Ethiopia. It is perhaps a bitter irony that the RSF and its leader – originally Darfur Arab tribesmen used by Khartoum to fight and kill “African” tribes two decades ago – are seen by Cairo as the more “African” side versus the more “Arab” (meaning pro-Egypt) SAF.


Ethiopia should take full advantage of the situation

Stick to Ikolamani politics